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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
resident shareholders which is realized at the expense of resi-
dent shareholders.
One solution suggested by the trial judge in the Simanco
case33 would be to tax the gain in the hands of the corporation
while giving a tax credit to the resident taxpayer. This would
have the desirable effect of avoiding any unfair benefit to the
nonresident while insuring the equal treatment of the resident
and nonresident shareholder alike.
-EUGENE 0. DUFFY
TORTS
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided several tort cases
which are worthy of special mention and have been subdivided
into categories of releases, defamation, res ipsa loquitur, and
strict liability. Several significant cases on "duty" in negli-
gence actions have been omitted from this discussion in de-
ference to a comprehensive article on duty in a later issue of
volume 61. The significant cases on duty which the court
decided this term are Padilla v. Bydalek,' Coffey v. City of
Milwaukee,2 Clark v. Corby3 and Buel v. LaCrosse Transit Co.,
I. RELEASES
Krezinski v. Hay5 dealt with the effectiveness of a release
based on mutual mistake. In that case the trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendant was negligent in causing an automobile accident which
resulted in numerous injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant
denied negligence and asserted an affirmative defense, based
on a release in which the plaintiff released the defendant from
all claims and injuries "in any way growing out of, any and all
known and unknown personal injuries, developed or undevel-
oped, including death and property damage resulting or to re-
33. 1974 Wisconsin Term of Court, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 338, at 340 (1973-74).
1. 56 Wis. 2d 772, 203 N.W.2d 15 (1973); 74 Wis. 2d 46, 245 N.W.2d 915 (1976).
2. 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
3. 75 Wis. 2d 292, 249 N.W.2d 567 (1977).
4. 77 Wis. 2d 480, 253 N.W.2d 232 (1977).
5. 77 Wis. 2d 569, 253 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
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sult from an accident that occurred on or about the 28th day
of September, 1968."6 The plaintiff acknowledged the receipt
of $2,300 in consideration for the release.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint admitting the
release, but claiming reliance upon a mutual mistake of fact,
namely, mutual ignorance of a latent condition which existed
at the time of the release and later manifested itself in grand
mal epileptic seizures.
The defendant established a prima facie case for summary
judgment, based on the release, and the trial court found that
the plaintiff's supporting affidavits failed to create a factual
issue as to the existence of a mutual mistake.7
A release may be set aside on the ground of mistake, but
the mistake must be mutual on the part of both parties and not
unilateral. The mistake must also apply to a past or present
condition since a future fact is within the contemplation of the
parties in executing a release to cover all future injuries.' In
addition, consideration which is inadequate in light of the sub-
sequently discovered injury is a factor to be considered in es-
tablishing the mutual mistake necessary to void the release.,
In Krezinski, the plaintiff's affidavits raised issues of fact
by stating that her doctor failed to discover or observe the
neurological condition which later gave rise to the epileptic
seizures. That mistake of fact, as to her neurological condition,
was relied upon by the plaintiff and the defendants in negotiat-
ing and agreeing to the release. The court reversed the sum-
mary judgment, stating:
The nature and extent of a party's reliance on a mutually
accepted medical diagnosis is a question of fact. If the diag-
nosis failed to ascertain a then-existing but unknown condi-
tion caused by the incident which led to the suit, and the
6. Id. at 571, 253 N.W.2d at 523.
7. The standard for summary judgment is "whether the plaintiff's affidavit and
other proof reveal disputed material facts or undisputed material facts from which
reasonable inferences may be drawn raising a triable issue concerning alleged mutual
reliance upon a mistake of fact." Id. at 573, 253 N.W.2d at 524.
8. Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953) and Kowalke v. Milwau-
kee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 103 Wis. 472, 79 N.W. 762 (1899). Both of these cases
involved the same type of factual situation with a general release.
9. Jandrt v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 255 Wis. 618, 39 N.W.2d 698 (1949). Jandrt
also required a standard of clear and convincing evidence, "beyond reasonable contro-
versy" to overturn the release, but such a standard has never been followed.
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
parties relied on the diagnosis as the basis for settlement, the
release may be set aside.'0
As a result, the Krezinski case adopts the Doyle v.
Teasdale" definition at a mutual mistake. Doyle stressed that
a release was not a bar to an action for unknown injuries if they
were not within the parties' contemplation of the time of the
release. However, the release is binding if the parties intention-
ally and purposefully agreed to release all unknown injuries.
Whether the language and intent of the parties in any given
release covers unknown injuries is a question of fact which
must be decided at trial."2
Prior to Doyle, Kowalke v. Milwaukee Electric Railway and
Light, Co. '3 had distinguished a legal mistake from a mere
ignorance of the existing facts:
Where a party executes a release either ignorant of a fact or
meaning to waive all inquiry into it, or waives an investiga-
tion or inquiry after his attention has been called to it or its
possibility, he does not make a mistake in a legal sense and
there is no mutual mistake of fact."
Therefore, the plaintiff must have an unconscious ignorance of
the existence of the fact, rather than a lack of knowledge due
to an insufficient inquiry in searching for the fact. In Kowalke
the later injuries arose because the plaintiff was pregnant at
the time of the accident. During treatment after the accident,
the doctor suggested to the plaintiff that she might be pregnant
but the plaintiff did not believe the diagnosis and made no
further inquiry at the time. As a result, the plaintiff was later
barred from recovery by the release, since her lack of knowledge
was due to insufficient inquiry into the possibility of her preg-
nancy, rather than to the requisite unconscious ignorance.
Bryan v. Noble,'5 distinguished Kowalke and Doyle and
held that the Kowalke requirement of unconscious ignorance
was not affected by the Doyle decision on mutual mistake.
In Krezinski, the defendants argued, using both Kowalke
10. 77 Wis. 2d at 574, 253 N.W.2d at 525.
11. 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
12. Id. at 345-46, 57 N.W.2d at 389-90.
13. 103 Wis. 472, 79 N.W. 762 (1899).
14. Bryan v. Noble, 5 Wis. 2d 48, 52, 92 N.W.2d 226, 229 (1958), analyzing the
Kowalke doctrine.
15. 5 Wis. 2d 48, 92 N.W.2d 226 (1958).
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and Doyle, that the plaintiff meant to waive all inquiry into the
injuries by the release and she was alerted to the neurological
condition by virtue of her past medical history. The court felt
that the existence of such previous knowledge and the contrac-
tual intent to cover those aggravated conditions were purely
questions of fact which could not be decided on summary judg-
ment. 6
Therefore, where a plaintiff has executed a release for un-
known injuries, the plaintiff need only allege reliance upon a
mistaken medical diagnosis to withstand a motion to dismiss
or summary judgment. Issues of intent, mutual mistake, actual
reliance and causation must be decided at trial. Krezinski has
the effect of making it easier for the releasing plaintiff to get
to trial and avoid a dismissal by alleging a mistaken medical
diagnosis, but once at trial, the requirements to overturn the
release remain the same. Nevertheless, the decision raises
doubts about the effectiveness of releasing future injuries and
exposes the releasing party to later claims which the release
was designed to prevent.
II. DEFAMATION
A. The Constitutional Privilege
Schaefer v. State Bar"7 involved a suit in which the plaintiff
alleged the publication of defamatory matter by the Wisconsin
State Bar Association. Considerable litigation had arisen out
of the probate proceedings of the plaintiff's deceased husband,
and a series of newspaper articles recounted the plaintiff's legal
difficulties in probating the estate, specifically alleging that
legal fees had swallowed up one-half of the 1.4 million dollar
estate. The State Bar Association published a pamphlet in
response, explaining the plaintiff's legal difficulties and em-
phasizing that probate reform would not solve these particular
types of legal problems. The plaintiff sued, lleging three spe-
cific defamatory statements were contained in the pamphlet,
but the trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the
complaint.
The court cited the Restatement of Torts, section 559, for
the definition of defamation: "A communication is defamatory
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
16. 77 Wis. 2d at 576-77, 253 N.W.2d at 525-26.
17. 77 Wis. 2d 120, 252 N.W.2d 343 (1977).
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in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him."' 8
In determining whether a communication is defamatory,
the court must first decide, as a matter of law, if the communi-
cation is actually capable of a defamatory meaning, thereby
requiring a jury determination as to whether it was construed
as defamatory by the recipient of the communication. 9 Here,
two of the three alleged defamatory statements, relating to the
disparity in age between the plaintiff and her husband and the
retention of seven sets of attorneys by the plaintiff were held
to at least present a factual issue as to their defamatory con-
tent. More importantly, however, the court stated, in dicta,
"[b]ecause Mrs. Schaefer has made this a public issue or
matter of public concern, she must prove actual malice or a
reckless or careless disregard for the truth." 20
The statement creates some confusion as to the status of
Wisconsin defamation law in light of several recent United
States Supreme Court cases. In New York Times v. Sullivan2'
the Supreme Court established a constitutional privilege pro-
tecting the criticism of public officials which required a public
official to prove actual malice on the part of a publisher to
recover damages. Actual malice was defined as a publication
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. '2 2 In Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,2 the privilege was extended to public figures. The plu-
rality decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia24 further ex-
panded the privilege to include private persons involved in
matters of general or public interest.
Two recent cases, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 5 and Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,2 restricted this expansion of the Times doc-
trine. Gertz concluded that an attorney representing a family
18. Id. at 123, 252 N.W.2d at 345.
19. Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972).
20. 77 Wis. 2d at 125, 252 N.W.2d at 346. The court cited in support of this
proposition: Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972); Waldo v.
Journal Co., 45 Wis. 2d 203, 172 N.W.2d 680 (1969); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); and Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id. at 279-80.
23. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
24. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
25. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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in a civil suit against a police officer who had killed their son
was not a public figure, despite the public notoriety of the case.
In Firestone, the plaintiff alleged defamation by Time maga-
zine for its publication of a short article about the grounds of
the plaintiff's divorce. Firestone intimated that Gertz had, in
effect, overruled the Rosenbloom public issue extension, and
refocused upon the status of the plaintiff as a public figure to
justify the imposition of the Times rule. The Firestone Court
specifically refused to extend the constitutional protection to
reports of judicial proceedings simply because of the public
interest in those judicial proceedings:
Presumptively erecting the New York Times barrier against
all plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries from defamatory
falsehoods published in what are alleged to be reports of judi-
cial proceedings would effect substantial depreciation of the
individual's interest in protection from such harm, without
any convincing assurance that such a sacrifice is required
under the First Amendment .... There appears little reason
why these individuals [involved in judicial proceedings]
should substantially forfeit that degree of protection which
the law of defamation would otherwise afford them simply by
virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom.'
In Polzin v. Helmbrecht,"' Wisconsin adopted the
Rosenbloom extension of the constitutional privilege to private
individuals involved in matters of public or general concern.
Polzin concerned the applicability of the constitutional privi-
lege to a plaintiff who wrote a letter to the editor of a local
newspaper criticizing a reporter's coverage of a local political
controversy. The court applied the Times standard, noting,
"We think critics of the media, like appellant here, are entitled
to the same protections as were provided for the media in the
New York Times and Rosenbloom cases. The defendant's letter
discusses a matter of public concern. .. "I
However, a later case, Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.3 dis-
cussed Polzin and determined that the key to the distinction
between constitutional and nonconstitutional privileges was
the focus of the court on the "media" and the "matter of public
27. Id. at 456-57.
28. 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972). Rosenbloom was also followed in Ri-
chards v. Gruen, 62 Wis. 2d 97, 214 N.W.2d 309 (1974).
29. 54 Wis. 2d at 586, 196 N.W.2d at 690.
30. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
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concern." Calero also explained the distinction between apply-
ing the constitutional standard and simply following common
law standards of proof. Under the Times constitutional privi-
lege, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and con-
vincing evidence. However, at common law, where the consti-
tutional standard is not applied, the express malice" necessary
to recover punitive damages need only be shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
Calero involved a suit by the plaintiff against his former
employer for defamatory remarks made in several job reference
forms to prospective employers of the plaintiff. The court de-
termined that this case between private individuals did not
involve the Times constitutional standard and that therefore
the minimal burden of proof was proper.12 The court adopted
the Gertz rationale, which limits the extension of the Times
privilege because private individuals are unable to effectively
rebut defamatory statements and have not voluntarily exposed
themselves to public attention, comment and criticism. Since
the constitutional standard was not to be applied in these in-
stances, Gertz declared that, "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."33
This rule avoided what was considered by the Court to be an
abridgement created by the Rosenbloom public interest test of
the states' legitimate interest in protecting private individuals.
In Schaefer, Wisconsin apparently took advantage of the
autonomy reposited in the states by Gertz to define standards
of liability in suits by private individuals. It appears that Wis-
consin adopts the supposedly discarded Rosenbloom standard
since the court applied the Times rule of actual malice
"[b]ecause Mrs. Schaefer had made this a public issue or
matter of public concern."34 Both Gertz and Rosenbloom were
cited in support of applying the constitutional standard, while
Firestone was not cited.
There are two ways to interpret this holding. Either the
31. Express malice (at common law) is defined as "a defamatory statement moti-
vated by ill will, spite, envy, revenge, or other bad or corrupt motives." Id. at 506, 228
N.W.2d at 748.
32. Id. at 500, 228 N.W.2d at 745.
33. 418 U.S. at 347.
34. 77 Wis. 2d at 125, 252 N.W.2d at 346.
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court has chosen to maintain its own standard for defamation
cases, as per Gertz, by continuing to apply the Rosenbloom
public interest test to any statements arising out of judicial
proceedings initiated by the plaintiff, or, since this case arose
on demurrer, the imposition of the Times standard was dicta,
and the court actually requires a full factual determination of
a public figure or public controversy before requiring the con-
stitutional standard of actual malice. The second interpreta-
tion appears to be in harmony with the Supreme Court posi-
tion, while the first apparently ignores the Firestone language
pertaining to judicial proceedings.
B. Civil Conspiracy
Radue v. Dill35 was a rare civil conspiracy action. The plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants conspired to give state prose-
cuting authorities false information by attributing a check ille-
gally paid to a public official to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
claimed damage to his reputation and profession as a result of
the false testimony by defendants.
A civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more persons
by some concerted action to accomplish some unlawful purpose
or to accomplish by unlawful means some purpose not in itself
unlawful. ' '3 6 In Wisconsin there is no tort action specifically for
a civil conspiracy, but rather an action for damages caused by
the acts pursuant to the conspiracy.
In this case defendants demurred to the complaint, claim-
ing an absolute privilege for the statements which were made
during judicial proceedings. Generally, as a result of that abso-
lute privilege, there is no civil action for perjury. However, if
the perjury is only a step in the larger conspiracy then an action
may be maintained for damages if there are additional acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy, or if the action is based upon
fraud and deceit as well as conspiracy. 37 In addition, the acts
constituting the conspiracy itself need not themselves be civilly
actionable, because it is the existence of the overt acts of the
conspiracy causing damage which are crucial to the claim for
relief.3
35. 74 Wis. 2d 239, 246 N.W.2d 507 (1976).
36. Id. at 241, 246 N.W.2d at 509.
37. Id. at 242, 246 N.W.2d at 509-10.
38. Id. at 244, 246 N.W.2d at 510-11.
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In Radue, the plaintiff established a claim for relief in his
complaint by alleging that the conspiracy existed to damage
his reputation, trade and profession. Such a conspiracy is a
criminal violation under section 134.01,11 and civil damages are
available for injury caused by the violation of a criminal stat-
ute.40 The conspiracy must have existed specifically for the
purpose of so harming the plaintiff: "A conspiracy [solely] for
the purpose of committing perjury is an offense against the
public only, but a conspiracy for the purpose of injuring an-
other, if it results in damage to the other, is an offense for which
there may be recovery. "41
III. REs IPSA LOQUITUR
The application of the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur was examined in the context of both products liability and
medical malpractice.
The plainttiff-mechanic in Gierach v. Snap-On Tools
Corp.12 was injured when a ratchet wrench produced by the
defendant slipped, striking him in the face and teeth. Later, a
salesman for the defendant disassembled the wrench in the
presence of the plaintiff's co-employees and pointed out the
sheared gear tooth which had caused the wrench to slip. The
plaintiff claimed the gear tooth in the wrench was not properly
hardened, while the defendant argued that accumulated grease
and debris in the gear housing prevented the gear teeth from
fully engaging, thereby shearing off one tooth.43
The trial court gave a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the
jury, which allowed the jury to infer the defendant's negligence
without any direct testimony regarding the defendant's con-
duct at the time of the allegedly negligent act, the production
39. Wis. STAT. § 134.01 (1975) reads:
Any 2 or more persons who shall combine, associate, agree, mutually under-
take or concert together for the purpose of wilfully or maliciously injuring an-
other in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever,
or for the purpose of maliciously compelling another to do or perform any act
against his will, or preventing or hindering another from doing or performing any
lawful act shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more than
one year or by fine not exceeding $500.
40. 74 Wis. 2d at 245, 246 N.W.2d at 511.
41. Id. at 246, 246 N.W.2d at 511.
42. 79 Wis. 2d 47, 255 N.W.2d 465 (1977).
43. The defendant also established that a properly hardened gear tooth could with-
stand 5000 pounds of pressure, while the most pressure that could be applied by a
worker was approximately 1000 pounds.
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of the wrench. The two elements required to sustain a res ipsa
inference are that: 1. The occurrence was of the kind which
does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and 2.
the agency or instrumentality which caused the harm must
have been within the exclusive control of the defendant.4
The defendant objected on appeal rather than at trial to
linking res ipsa instructions with an alleged breach of the duty
to warn in a products liability action. Such objections must be
made at the trial court level to be valid, but, even though the
objections were raised too late, the court nevertheless discussed
the issue: "a res ipsa inference is permissible in respect to any
tort which occasions unintentional personal injuries if the ele-
ments necessary for instructing on that inference are placed in
evidence."45
In this instance all the evidentiary preconditions were satis-
fied by the plaintiff; the gears could not have slipped in the
absence of negligence and the defendant was in exclusive con-
trol of the product. The court said control need only be control
of the factors which caused the injury. Even though the wrench
was not in the defendant's physical possession at the time of
the accident, the defendant was in control at the time of the
negligent act, manufacturing a defective product.
Although it is not cited, the Gierach decision adopts the
rule of Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co.," in which the court
analyzed and permitted the application, of res ipsa loquitur in
strict liability cases to establish a defective product:
[A] res ipsa type of inference is enough to establish a defect
if the plaintiff can show that he was properly using the prod-
uct and can negative other possible causes of the product
failure since it left the manufacturer's control.... The plain-
tiffs only have to introduce evidence which affords a reasona-
ble basis for the conclusion that it was more likely than not
that conduct of the defendant manufacturer was a substan-
tial factor in the injury.4T
Finally, the defendant was trapped by its own allegation of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff for allowing
44. See Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ripon Co-operative, 50 Wis. 2d 431, 436, 184
N.W.2d 65, 67 (1971); Turk v. H.C. Prange Co., 18 Wis. 2d 547, 553, 119 N.W.2d 365,
369 (1963).
45. 79 Wis. 2d at 53, 255 N.W.2d at 467.
46. 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973).
47. Id. at 73-74, 211 N.W.2d at 817.
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grease and debris to accumulate in the gear housing. Since the
defendant indicated an awareness of the possibility of such an
accumulation and failed to warn of the danger, the manufac-
turer's duty to warn had been breached, which further sup-
ported the jury finding of liability.
In Hoven v. Kelble,4" the court considered both the use of
res ipsa and the proposed adoption of strict liability in medical
malpractice cases. The strict liability issue is analyzed in the
following section.
Hoven arose from the defendant's appeal of an overruled
demurrer to the inclusion of res ipsa in the complaint. The
complaint sufficiently alleged negligence against the defendant
hospital, doctor and anesthesiologist for injuries resulting from
a heart attack plaintiff suffered during a lung biopsy. The com-
plaint also alleged a separate cause of action against each de-
fendant based on the permissive inference of negligence al-
lowed by res ipsa loquitur.
Res ipsa has previously been allowed in Wisconsin medical
malpractice cases. However, in such cases it is generally held
that the doctrine may be invoked only where a lay person is
able to say as a matter of common knowledge that the injuries
caused by the medical treatment would not have resulted in
the absence of negligence.49 In complicated medical malprac-
tice cases, the plaintiff may use expert testimony to "educate"
the jury and provide the common knowledge basis upon which
to make the inference.'" However, res ipsa may not be applied
where specific acts of negligence are proven by the plaintiff,
since such proof defeats the purpose of the permissive infer-
ence. '
Since res ipsa is an evidentiary doctrine it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to include the elements in the complaint. Nev-
ertheless, it is well settled that res ipsa may be alleged in a
complaint to withstand a demurrer or motion to dismiss.5 2 Suf-
ficient facts must be alleged to show the essential elements
48. 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977).
49. Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 22, 121 N.W.2d 255, 266 (1963).
50. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 590, 207 N.W.2d 297, 308 (1973). The
Fehrman court also refused to adopt the "rarity test," i.e., using the happening of an
unusual result or reaction to the administration of a drug or treatment by a physician
as a basis for establishing a res ipsa inference. A similar result was reached in Trogun.
51. Knief v. Sargent, 40 Wis. 2d 4, 7, 161 N.W.2d 232, 234 (1968).
52. 79 Wis. 2d at 449, 256 N.W.2d at 382, citing Szafranski v. Radetzky, 31 Wis.
2d 119, 132-33, 141 N.W.2d 902, 909 (1966).
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required to draw the inference." The res ipsa allegation may be
made concurrently with or alternatively to allegations of spe-
cific negligent acts. 4
Actually, whether res ipsa is adequately pleaded is of little
significance since the doctrine may be used by the plaintiff, if
sufficiently established through the course of the trial, without
any reference to it in the complaint.5 However, if the plaintiff's
sole claim for relief is based on res ipsa, a proper pleading of
the doctrine is crucial to withstand a motion to dismiss.
The defendants in Hoven objected not only to the general
res ipsa allegations in the complaint, but also to the individual
allegations that the plaintiff was under the exclusive control of
each defendant at the time of the negligent act. The defendants
argued that such allegations of multiple control failed to meet
the required standard of "exclusive control," one of the neces-
sary elements of res ipsa.
The court refused to read the "exclusive control" require-
ment literally, but rather relied on the Restatement of Torts
(Second) section 328D which creates a standard of "responsible
causes" rather than exclusive control for res ipsa.58 The respon-
sible cause is established by sufficiently eliminating any con-
duct of the plaintiff or other third parties as a cause, leaving
only the actions of the principal defendant. The other elements
of res ipsa are, of course, also necessary. The court cited Pros-
ser's expanded theory in place of the stricter "exclusive con-
trol" requirement: "[I]t would be far better, and much confu-
sion would be avoided, if the idea of 'control' were discarded
altogether, and we were to say merely that the apparent cause
of the accident must be such that the defendant would be
responsible for any negligence connected with it." 57
Such an interpretation is consistent with several previous
Wisconsin cases applying the res ipsa doctrine even though the
agency or instrumentality causing harm was not in the
"exclusive control" or physical possession of the defendant."8
53. 79 Wis. 2d at 449, 256 N.W.2d at 382.
54. Id. at 451, 256 N.W.2d at 382.
55. Szafranski v. Radetzky, 31 Wis. 2d 119, 132, 141 N.W.2d 902, 909 (1966). See
also Ghiardi, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Wisconsin, 39 MARQ. L. Rav. 361, 379 (1956).
56. 79 Wis. 2d at 452, 256 N.W.2d at 383.
57. W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 221 (4th ed. 1971).
58. Gierach v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 79 Wis. 2d 47, 53, 255 N.W.2d 465,467 (1977);
Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, 64 Wis. 2d 532, 539-40, 219 N.W. 2d 393, 396-97 (1974);
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In this instance, the allegation of exclusive control by all
three individual defendants was not deemed to be a fatal defect
in the res ipsa cause of action. The allegation of control over
the anesthesized plaintiff was a sufficient allegation of each
defendant's control over the instrumentalities which purport-
edly caused damage to the plaintiff. However, at the trial, the
plaintiff would have to establish that a single defendant was
actually in control of the instrumentalities which caused the
harm. The court noted that the alternative pleadings were just
for that purpose, i.e., "to anticipate the possibility that proof
may be addressed sufficient to bring negligence home to one of
the defendants by showing that at material times that defen-
dant was in control and the others were not. '59
Both of these cases serve to expand the exclusive control
element of res ipsa, even though the court has not in the past
required a much stricter reading. Nevertheless, the expanded
definition will aid plaintiffs in utilizing the permissive infer-
ence, especially in products liability cases where control may
be a substantial factor in the use of the doctrine to establish
negligence.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
Hoven v. Kelble ° also dealt with an attempt to change the
negligence standard of reasonable care under the circumstan-
ces traditionally used as the measure of conduct in negligence
cases in general, and medical malpractice cases in particular.
However, the court rejected the plaintiff's plea to extend a
strict liability theory based on Dippel v. Sciano"l to doctors in
medical malpractice actions.
The plaintiff argued to extend strict liability from products
under the Restatement of Torts (Second) section 402A to medi-
cal services, requiring a defective medical service, which is de-
fined as one which does not meet the "reasonable expectations
of the consumer."6 The basic tenet of this philosophy is the
Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 70-71, 211 N.W.2d 810, 815-16 (1973);
Zarling v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wis. 2d 596, 600-02, 87 N.W.2d 263, 266
(1958); and Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 639-45, 64 N.W.2d 221, 231-
33 (1954).
59. 79 Wis. 2d at 455, 256 N.W.2d at 384.
60. 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977).
61. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The Dippel case adopted the strict
liability rule in products liability cases.
62. Plaintiff in the Hoven case relied on Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Serv-
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possibility of cure by the doctor. If the cure or expected medical
result is not impossible to attain, the consumer may reasonably
expect to be cured. If the result is not achieved, the doctor or
other health care personnel are strictly liable. Justice Abra-
hamson summarized the argument:
[Tihe essence of plaintiffs' position appears to be that if a
plaintiff could show that a hypothetical virtually perfectly
informed doctor, working in a perfectly equipped hospital,
could have avoided the untoward result, the plaintiff could
recover, notwithstanding that the defendants exercised rea-
sonible care in all respects. If attainment of the goal, or
avoidance of the malocurrence is possible, then failure to
attain the goal or to avoid the maloccurrence renders the
service defective."
The court refused to adopt this novel6 theory because to do
so would substantially change the standard of ordinary care
which has been consistently applied in Wisconsin to negligence
actions.15 This decision is consistent with the court's rejection
of the similar "rarity of result" standard advanced by plaintiffs
in other medical malpractice cases. The court has refused to
allow a res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence simply because
the medical care resulted in an untoward rare result.55Finally,
the plaintiffs' theory would, in effect, make the doctor an in-
surer of the service but the intent of strict liability is not to
make the seller of a product the insurer of that product, but
rather to aid the plaintiff's difficult burden of proof in products
liability cases.67 ,
However, the court did find some merit in the plaintiff's
theory, and stated in dicta:
ice Transactions - Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV.
661.
63. 79 Wis. 2d at 460, 256 N.W.2d at 387.
64. The court's search of the authorities failed to disclose a single case applying
strict liability to professional services. 79 Wis. 2d at 463-64, 256 N.W.2d at 388-89.
65. See also Schuster v. St. Vincent Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 135, 140-43, 472 N.W.2d 421,
423 (1969). "[A] plaintiff must prove the defendant failed to give him, not the highest
degree of care, but merely the reasonable care and skill usually possessed by physicians
of the same school." Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 584, 207 N.W.2d 297, 305
(1973).
66. Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 25-26, 121 N.W.2d 255, 267-68 (1963); Trogun
v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d at 590-92, 207 N.W.2d at 308-09.
67. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 238 N.W.2d 76, 79-80 (1976); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
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[flt may be admitted that many of the justifications for
strict liability have force regarding professional medical serv-
ices. The provider of medical services appears to stand in
substantially the same position with respect to the patient as
the seller of goods does with the consumer. The typical pur-
chaser of medicl [sic] services cannot evaluate the quality
of care offered because medical services are complex and in-
frequently bought. The medical care market gives the pur-
chaser little assistance in enabling the purchaser to evaluate
what he or she is buying. It is generally the physician - not
the patient - who determines the kind of services to be ren-
dered and how often. It is the physician not the patient who
prescribes other goods and services, e.g., drugs, therapy, and
hospitalization, that should supplement the physician's serv-
ices. The physician is in a better position than the patient to
determine and improve the quality of the services, and the
patient's reliance on the doctor's skill, care and reputation is
perhaps greater than the reliance of the consumer of goods.
The difficulties faced by plaintiffs in carrying the burden of
proving negligence on the part of a doctor are well known
... . The hospital and doctor are in a better position than
the patient to bear and distribute the risk of loss. 8
Nevertheless, the effect of such a theory on medical mal-
practice insurance, the inherent differences between medical
services and products, the need for readily available medical
services, and the likelihood of increased medical costs from
adopting such a theory presented strong enough public policy
arguments to prevent the court from permitting such an exten-
sion of strict liability, at least at this time.
Ross A. ANDERSON
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
I. INHERITANCE TAX RATES: SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
In re Estate of Walker' dealt with the right of certain distri-
butees to exempt from state inheritance tax a portion of the
property received.' The amounts exempted in Wisconsin Stat-
68. 79 Wis. 2d at 468-69, 256 N.W.2d at 391 (footnotes omitted).
1. 75 Wis. 2d 93, 248 N.W.2d 410 (1977).
2. There are four classifications of distributees: Class A: surviving spouse, lineal
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